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Hsieh, Wayne Wei-siang West Pointers and the Civil War: The Old Army in
War and Peace. The University of North Carolina Press, $30.00 ISBN
978-0-8078-3278-3
Crossing the Deadly Ground Once More
Over the last three decades, scholars such as Edward M. Coffman, William
B. Skelton, James L. Morrison, and others have produced essential studies
illuminating both the antebellum army as an institution and the myriad roles it
played in the development of larger nineteenth-century American culture.
Equally numerous in recent years have been works addressing the so-called
rifle-musket revolution and its presumed effect on Civil War combat. Books by
Paddy Griffith, Brent Nosworthy, and Earl J. Hess have chipped away at the
consensus, most distinctively expressed by Perry D. Jamieson and Grady
McWhiney in their landmark 1982 study Attack and Die, which posits that new
advances in weapons technologies rendered “Old Army" tactics and doctrine
obsolete and created the horrific butcher’s bill incurred on fields from Malvern
Hill to Franklin. In this volume, hailed by the UNC Press as the “first book to
show how the antebellum U.S. Army, and especially West Point graduates,
affected the course of the Civil War," Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh attempts to forge
definitive connections between the pre-1860 army officer corps and the
internecine conflict it came to dominate while at the same time providing added
criticism of the rifle-musket paradigm. This ambitious agenda, covered as it is in
198 pages of prose, is only partly realized; too, failings in its focus, evidentiary
base, and temperament prevent it from gaining the status that its press promises.
There is, withal, much to admire in this volume. Hsieh, an associate
professor of history at the United States Naval Academy, displays firm command
of the organizational and experiential factors influencing the development of
Civil War doctrine and tactics. In the book’s best chapters, the author skillfully
explores institutional efforts to develop and maintain the army’s infantry,
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artillery, and mounted standards from 1815-1860. His brief treatment of the war
with Mexico also shines, illustrating the performance of those regulars who
viewed their successes south of the Rio Grande above all as vindication of their
worth to an American society that had long embraced the citizen-soldier ideal.
Indeed, it is Hsieh’s principal contention that the antebellum United States
Army’s normative influence—forged through professional discourse as well as
on the battlefield—created a “rough equilibrium in competence" between the
military leadership of North and South (116). This factor, the author avers,
played a more fundamental role in determining operational impasse during the
years 1861-1865 than did either advancements in musketry or the systematic
erection of field fortifications.
Notwithstanding important differences in such matters as sectional
recruiting policies, the armies of the Union and Confederacy were peer forces in
an organizational, doctrinal, technological, and leadership sense. Little wonder,
then, that Civil War combat was so bloody and so often barren of decisive
results. This point is of signal importance, to be sure, and the reader might
expect to find in the second half of the book ample evidence that sheds light
upon what appears to be a most plausible thesis. Instead, Hsieh here moves away
from his controlling thought, endeavoring rather to discuss (paradoxically) the
divergent command styles of the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the
Potomac as well as questions of tactical finesse covered in years past and in
extenso by Griffith, Nosworthy, and others. Moreover, much is left out of the
story. One might, for example, expect proportional coverage of Civil War field
armies other than those that operated within the eastern theater or
acknowledgment that constraints emanating from Washington played no small
part in limiting the Potomac army’s ability to achieve operational success from
1862 to 1864. Last, the author at times exhibits a self-assurance that borders
upon stridence in his attempt to refute the findings of numerous honored Civil
War scholars. In a work as ill-defined as this and with so few pages with which
to examine his subject(s), Hsieh’s tone cannot help but come across at times as
pleading. However, despite these deficiencies, West Pointers and the Civil War
is a valuable work, one that is bound to stimulate discussion and further
evaluation of American military professionalism and its effect upon the sectional
conflict’s military course.
Christopher S. Stowe serves as Associate Professor of History at the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Lee, Virginia. The author of
numerous reviews and articles in Civil War and military history, Stowe currently
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is completing a biography of George Gordon Meade to be published by the Kent
State University Press.
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